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Knowledge-related variables are gradually gaining currency as vital drivers in developing 
countries’ quest to catch-up in productivity and income. But the successful recent 
experience of the few along these lines has for the most part not been followed up in the 
developing world at large. This is shown, for example, by the de-prioritization of 
competence building in resource allocation by most developing countries during the last 
decade or so. 3 
 
At least three reasons can be pointed out for this lack of congruence between what 
admittedly needs to be done and actual policy responses. To begin with, the search for 
Pareto optima built into conventional policy prescriptions diverts the attention from 
priority competence building issues, since the price system often fails to serve as a guide 
for policy-making.4 Then, effective informational feedback mechanisms with the private 
sector on systemic failures and their remedies, which are indispensable to prevent policy-
makers’ errors stemming from uncertainty and imperfect knowledge, are seldom given 
priority5. Lastly, appropriate tools, heuristics and metrics as well as methodologies for 
needs assessment and strategic prioritization, including those relating to policy 
capabilities themselves, are hardly available. Releasing these mutually reinforcing policy-
related constraints and focusing on the stimulation of the demand for scientific and 
                                                                  
1 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Buenos Aires C1054AAH, Argentina, 
fsercovich@mincyt.gov.ar , (54911) 62716587 
2 Hebrew University of Jerusalem, msmorris@mscc.huji.ac.il 
3 As far as human development is concerned, without which competence building can hardly proceed, the 
UNDP states: “If current trends continue, the MDGs will be missed by a wide margin. Instead of seizing 
the moment, the world’s governments are stumbling towards a heavily sign-posted and easily avoidable 
human development failure…” UNDP, 2005, chapter 1, p. 17. More specific indicators, such as those 
relating to national expenditures on R&D, trade capacity building and capacity building programs for 
agricultural improvement, including the training of agricultural scientists, only add to this dismal picture. 
4 While the price system understates the demand for innovation because markets tend to under-reward 
innovation, system weaknesses often block the supply of skills and expertise, as well as their application to 
innovative activity. 
5 This, in turn relates to the resiliency of the linear view of the innovation process. 
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technological talent through innovative approaches to private sector development have 
been among the keys to successful catch-up experiences. 
 
Since structural change, particularly in a developing context, is seldom if ever seamless 
and automatic, unlocking its virtuous interplay with economic growth normally requires 
deliberate capability building actions (Kuznets, 1971, Chenery et al (eds), 1986, Saviotti 
and Pyka, 2002, Fagerberg et al., 1999, Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2007). Dynamic policy 
approaches are called for to overcome system failures in the development of both, 
innovative capabilities in the business sector and the scientific, technological and higher 
education (STE) infrastructure (e.g., Teubal, 1997) 6 
 
While the need for proactive competence building policies is hardly in contention at the 
level of discourse, its effective incorporation into the national policy mix is less than fully 
understood. An integrated policy perspective to underpin actual and context-specific 
policy-making is still missing. To fill this gap, we discuss below a system evolutionary 
perspective relevant for both, developing and developed countries. Some attempts along 
these lines have been made.7 However, much remains to be done. One major hurdle is 
incomplete knowledge about innovation systems, their desirable context-specific 
properties, and their emergence and transformation dynamics.  
 
Although the innovation system approach is well on its way to become mainstream8, not 
enough is still known about the dynamics of innovation system’s formation and growth. 
This is particularly the case in developing countries, where the conditions for the 
emergence of such systems feature stubborn failures on which cogent policy answers are 
urgently needed but still largely wanting (Sercovich and Dolun, 2005). The absence of a 
sufficiently articulated understanding of differentiated policy development processes, 
including the respective institutions and capabilities, is another stumbling block (Teubal, 
2002). 
 
Effective competence building policies rely on the evolving interaction between business 
innovation, knowledge systems and policy learning. In conjunction, they amount to a 
collective enterprise within which the mastering of the interplay between the public and 
private dimensions of knowledge is key. Incentives to the development of business 
innovation cannot yield success in the absence of social and policy capability 
development (Sercovich and Dolun, ibid). But this cannot take place at once. Countries 
acquire these capabilities along variegated long-term trajectories. Some common features 
can, however, be discerned for purposes of policy development. A stylized conceptual 
framework on this is submitted and illustrated below and the respective implications 
discussed. 
 
In this paper we pursue three specific objectives:  
 
i. Submit an evolutionary view of long-term structural change9  
                                                                  
6 Non-market institutions supply the main governance structure in a broad range of activities where market 
exchanges fail to provide appropriate, effective outcomes (Nelson, 2005). Those relating to the scientific, 
technological and higher educational activities are key among them.  
7 Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008a. 
8 This approach already informs policy in a good deal of countries and multinational financial institutions.  
9 The respective empirics rely largely on Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003. 
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ii. Present and illustrate the basic elements of a systems evolutionary perspective to 
innovation and technological policy-making, taking both capability building and 
other dynamic factors on board; and  
iii. Demonstrate applications of the framework. 
 
The systems evolutionary perspective presently adopted seems particularly suitable to 
address knowledge-based economic growth in the present phase of globalization.  
 
2. Phases in structural change and knowledge-based economic growth 
 
Long-run economic growth can be depicted in terms of two interacting dimensions: one 
has to do with the phases of structural change and economic growth; the other is about 
policy development. This section focuses on the former. Our approach restates Imbs and 
Wacziarg, 2003 (I&W from now onwards) within an evolutionary framework.10 The next 
section discusses the unfolding trajectory of the matching policy development dimension 
throughout innovation and technological policy phases.  
 
2.1. Testing Existing Theories 
 
As economies grow, sectoral production and employment become more diversified until 
fairly late in the development process. Then incentives to specialize ensue as driving 
force (I&W). Export development appears to follow a similar pattern (Benefictis et al., 
2007). Concurrent and interacting diversity generation and selection/reproduction 
processes underpin – and get entwined along – this long-term trend.  
 
I&W set out to characterize the pattern of sectoral diversification along the development 
path. From this perspective, they survey data on sector-level employment and value 
added for a wide cross-section of countries at various levels of dis-aggregation. They 
detect a U-shaped pattern as per capita income grows, with sectoral diversification 
ensuing over a range of income values, followed by sectoral concentration only at rather 
high levels of income per capita. This finding contrasts sharply with the monotonic 
relationship between diversification and income predicted as a result of income effects on 
consumption shares (Deaton, 1997)11. Far from standard theories, the U-shaped pattern is 
consistent with a dynamic Ricardian interpretation based on the interaction between 
productivity increases and changes in trading costs. 
 
I&W findings challenge the prediction of sectoral specialization based on efficiency 
reasons associated with comparative advantages and with increasing returns and 
geographical economies of scale except once a relatively advanced stage of 
industrialization sets in (Feenstra, 2004).  
 
If sectoral specialization occurs only in relatively high-income economies, and countries 
do in fact diversify over most of the earlier development path, the conventional view of 
comparative advantage breaks down: The key to economic development would thus not 
be the standard ‘comparative advantage’ stemming from specialization but, rather, the 
acquisition of mastery over a growing range of activities. And yet, clearly, only few 
countries manage to conduct a sustainable diversification-driven growth – most failing to 
                                                                  
10 See Nelson, 1995 and Foster and Metcalfe, 2001. 
11 This interpretation is also informed by portfolio arguments (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997, see sub-
section 2.2.2.) 
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bridge the income and productivity gap with the more advanced economies, as they are 
unable to sort out systemic hurdles associated with technological, informational and 
coordination externalities. Diversification is not a natural process in an increasingly 
integrated world economy.12 It will not happen or will likely become truncated or delayed 
because of, inter alia, the absence of policy development. 
 
2.2 An Evolutionary Interpretation of Structural Change 
 
Provided that, when present, low-level equilibrium traps are overcome, we posit that 
economies traverse three main stylized, structural change-related phases as income per 
capita rises over time. These phases (processes, not states) are characterized by various 
mixes of diversity generation and selection/reproduction/development events13, 
eventually leading to dynamic comparative advantages revealed through new sectors and 
product classes with the potential to become sustainable to the extent that they can 
accommodate changing competitive conditions in the world market. They, both result 
from, and cause the progressive formation and growth of a country’s innovation system. 
 
2.2.1. Phase 0 (Ph 0) – Low-level equilibrium 
 
Although the template Malthusian Ph-0 did protractedly precede the raise of capitalism, 
neither it nor its variants are a necessary phase of modern economic development in 
general. Nevertheless, they do currently bedevil many least developed countries 
(LDCs).14 
 
Reduced to its bare fundamentals, Ph-0 is characterized by economic and social 
stagnation around subsistence levels as a result of the lack of savings and capital 
accumulation, absence of productivity gains and wanting human condition15. Within it 
there is little or no scope for the development of innovative capabilities. 
 
Such kind of regime, long-standing and ubiquitous in the history of the world economy, 
is still very much among us, albeit with a changed dynamic. Overcoming Ph-0 entails two 
                                                                  
12 Diversification is just one feature of the much more complex process of structural change. See discussion 
in the light of evolutionary theory in subsection 2.2. Although I&W do attempt to characterize the 
evolution of industrialization through the pattern of sectoral diversification, their interpretation is not 
explicitly evolutionary.  
13 For these are evolutionary theory concepts; see Foster and Metcalfe, op. cit. and Metcalfe and Foster, 
2004. Sometimes selection is visualized as prior to, and separate from, reproduction/development of the 
entity being selected. Selection means a reduction of variety, while reproduction/development means an 
increase in the share of the variant selected in the total population. In some cases the latter may involve the 
creation of multi-agent structures or higher level organizations like sectors, markets and clusters (these will 
possess emergent properties and organizational forms. For a simple statement of the nature of emergence, 
see Odell, 2000). For our purposes here it can be said that in these cases selection occurs at the ‘sector’ 
rather than at the ‘firm’ level.  
14 This predicament affects mostly some fifty-eight small countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Central Asia, accounting for nearly a billion people who lag considerably behind the rest of the developing 
world in human development (see Collier, 2007). These countries were worse off by the turn of the 
millennium in absolute terms that they were 1970. Collier distinguishes four kinds of trap: the conflict trap, 
the natural resource trap, that affecting land-lock countries with ‘bad’ neighbours and that of bad 
governance (Collier, op. cit., Part 2). Sachs (2006,. chapter 3) also distinguishes various kinds of 
(interrelated) traps, including those caused by poverty itself, physical geography, demography, fiscal issues 
and governance. These traps often burden the countries concerned simultaneously (in various mixes) or in 
sequence. 
15 For an early contribution on this issue see Nelson, 1959. 
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transitions, relating to human development and productivity, particularly in agriculture, 
respectively. 
 
2.2.1.1. Human development transition 
 
Prior to the industrial revolution, population remained nearly stagnant in the very long 
run16. Instead, the population of LDCs currently trapped into Malthusian-type 
predicaments tends to grow fast, thus aggravating poverty. In today’s industrialized 
societies the human development transition, which includes health, educational and 
environmental dimensions, in addition to the demographic one, was triggered by gradual 
investments in human capital associated with the acceleration of technological change 
(Galor and Weil, 2000). In fact, human capital formation and fertility reductions went 
hand in hand with technological change, productivity gains and improvements in living 
standards. Put other way, the human development and productivity transitions coevolved 
endogenously. 
 
Because of different initial conditions, including those relating to income distribution and 
access to education (Rodrik, 1996; Stewart, 2001), the LDCs of today are prevented from 
following the sequence verified in both, the industrialized and the successful catching-up 
countries. Furthermore, the burden of famine, diseases and ethnic and tribal conflicts 
incites a high birth rate and low investment in human capital (Sachs, 2006). Rather than 
resulting from technological change and human capital investment in the long run, 
human development has largely become a necessary condition for economic growth to 
take place.17  
 
2.2.1.2. Productivity transition 
 
Closely linked with the above, the productivity transition, fundamentally in agriculture, is 
another necessary condition to supersede Ph-0. Such has been the case in Asia and Latin 
America, where most countries managed to experience a take-off in agricultural yields 
during the 1960s and 1970s. In the case of the successful catching-up countries of East 
Asia this was accompanied by widespread basic education and relatively low income 
inequality. Although prospects are beginning to look a bit brighter, most LDCs are still 
far from entering this transition. For instance, for the best part of the last half a century, 
agricultural yields in sub-Saharan Africa have remained essentially stagnant, while those 
of South and East Asia have nearly tripled (Otsuka and Yamano, 2005).18 
                                                                  
16 The rate of growth of the population from the beginning of our era to 1750 has been estimated at 0.06 per 
cent per year (Livi Bacci, 1997) whereas the rate of growth of GDP per capita between the sixth and the 
sixteenth centuries was approximately nil (Maddison, 1982). 
17 Two hundred and fifty years ago the difference in income or productivity per head between the riches 
and poorest country in the world was approximately 5:1; today this difference has increased to 400:1 
(Landes, 1998). The ensuing gap in capability between the countries at the bottom, on one hand, and the 
industrialized and catching up countries, on the other, only aggravates the challenge since it entails a 
growing marginalization of international trade, capital and technology flows, featuring what Collier (op. 
cit,) calls an increasingly ‘hostile’ environment. As a result, relapses into Ph-0 by countries that manage to 
break low-level equilibrium traps by enjoying growth spurs thanks to events such as improvements in their 
terms of trade or natural resource discoveries, cannot be ruled out. The priority to be given to human 
development in this context has been acknowledged by the donor community through the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals, although clearly income-poverty needs to be tackled in an equally forceful way. 
18 Furthermore, the British industrial revolution is considered part of a very broad productivity advance, 




In the industrial countries, accelerated industrialization induced the demographic 
transition. Increases in income due to technological change gave raise to spending more 
on education and this, in turn, led to the demographic transition (largely through 
substituting quality for quantity in child rearing). During the early stages of 
industrialization there actually was a substantial increase in population growth that only 
later got reversed through a demographic transition entailing significant reductions in 
fertility rates and population growth, which helped to translate technological change into 
raising income per capita. Thus, human capital became crucial during the second phase of 
industrialization (Galor and Weil, op. cit.). 
 
Different is the sequence nowadays. The productivity and the human development 
transitions need to be looked at as complementary triggers of industrialization. 
Productivity growth in agriculture goes hand in hand with improvements in infrastructure 
and irrigation and, more particularly, with internal migrations, urbanization, social 
mobility and a growing industrial labour force, thus feeding the demographic transition 
by encouraging fertility reductions and inducing investments in skill acquisition. In turn, 
the human development transition, by releasing demographic pressures, reducing gender 
inequities and valorising human capital, eases productivity growth and facilitates 
increases in income per capita. 
 
Ph-0 today requires a specific, differentiated policy approach, where the absolute priority 
is addressing human development (nutrition, health, housing and education) along with 
releasing stubborn infrastructure, environmental, governance and productivity constraints 
(especially in agriculture). These are indispensable enabling conditions to attain, at least 
partially, the transitions that come prior to addressing the kind of issues discussed in the 
bulk of this paper. 
The human development and productivity transitions need not be completed for a country 
to enter Ph-1, during which those transitions can get deepened and consolidated. But the 
insights on this matter cannot be gleaned just by looking at the aggregate relationships 
between income, population and technological change. One needs to dig deeper into the 
nature of the selection/variation/reproduction processes involved. 
 
2.2.2. Phase 1 (Ph-1) – Variety Generation and the Beginnings of Firm-Level Selection 
 
During Ph-1, as income per capita grows, variety generation and diversification tend to 
prevail over selection and reproduction/development. On the whole, this helps, inter alia, 
neutralizing the impact of sector-specific shocks by reducing aggregate volatility 
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). This, provided that the effects of income growth on 
demand patterns -- Engel law -- are not prematurely overridden by the forces driving 
efficiency gains19.  
                                                                  
19 The way trade opening is conducted may strongly influence the relative strength of these two influences. 
Evidence for China, for instance, suggests that, after trade was opened, the concentration of industries 
across provinces fell, at least for some time (Young 2000, Naughton, 2003, Poncet 2003). In I&W the 
stages of diversification result from the interaction of productivity increases and trading costs. In a dynamic 
Ricardian model with a continuum of goods, aggregate national productivity gains relative to the rest of the 
world entail a broadening range of domestically produced goods. Depending on the course of the 
relationship between relative productivity and the fall in transport costs, countries are predicted to diversify 
until a stage is reached where the forces of concentration begin to prevail. Such would be the case, for 
example, when closing the technological gap becomes increasingly difficult whereas transport costs decline 
linearly or if the technological gap falls at a constant rate but the decline in transport costs accelerates as 
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Ph-1 features the pervasive surfacing, alongside already existing traditional activities, of 
varied new ones, mostly led by non-R&D innovative small firms.20 These new activities 
are largely experimental, i.e., not fully competitively tested. They represent evolutionary 
variation. This does not mean that a measure (or the beginning) of selection processes 
cannot take place already during this phase. Selection at this stage, however, will occur 
largely at the firm level or even at lower levels of organization, such as individual 
products or processes new to the organization or to the economy, rather than at the 
product class or industry level. To this post-variation process we call type a selection 21 
Moreover, it is conceivable that in some cases ‘selection’ in Ph1 might rapidly lead to 
evolutionary ‘reproduction/development’. Thus, as soon as pioneering activities 
materialize, if and when prima facie commercially feasible, they may begin to get 
diffused, triggering a process of learning, rationalization, efficiency gains, imitation and 
new firm entry which would eventually drive relatively less successful firms out of the 
market. Still, during this phase, the forces of diversity generation (predominantly related 
to firms rather than to industries) on the whole override those of 
selection/reproduction/development.  
 
A successful Ph-1 also involves the creation of a broad set of innovation-related 
competences that facilitate a deepening of selection (both by the market and, sometimes, 
by means of policies seeking to overcome market and system failures) as well as 
reproduction in subsequent phases. This, in turn, requires a sufficiently broad and 
diversified variation process. Indeed, with the exception of a few specialized, largely 
export-oriented and, often, natural resource-based firms, most business enterprises during 
this phase undertake a variety of technical, organizational and managerial learning 
processes across a broad range of activities. In subsequent phases, and in response to 
capability acquisition, on the one hand, and to market opportunities, on the other, these 
processes become progressively more focused, specialized and differentiated as the 
economy attains higher levels of development. Thus, only once business enterprises, 
along with their complementary agents, have acquired broad-spectrum innovative 
competences, as it tends to occur during the Ph-1, can they afford to seek more 
specialized innovative capability development tracks in subsequent phases.22 
 
2.2.3. Phase 2 (Ph-2) – Deepening of Selection/Development 
 
During Ph-2 a deepening of type b selection takes place i.e. a selection characterized by 
the emergence of higher-level organizations, such as new industries, clusters and markets. 
23. More and more successful firms test their competences in competitive markets at 
home and abroad and begin using innovation-related adaptive and recombinant 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
capital is accumulated. I&W conclude, along with Chenery and Syrquin 1975, that structural change during 
industrialization responds endogenously to trade policy and economic growth. 
20 Globalization makes it increasingly feasible for a subgroup of industrializing economies to also generate 
a small segment of innovative, R&D-based, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rather early in the 
process. 
21 Type a selection processes take place predominantly at the level of the individual organization and is for 
the most part governed by the market.  
22 Policy-makers in Ph-1 must also assure the existence of a basic set of science, technology and higher 
education institutions to sustain the accelerated innovation required for subsequent phases. 
23 Type b selection is also governed by the market or could be mediated by a policy-driven strategic thrust, 
which becomes possible as innovation systems grow and mature. Ideally by Ph-3 the national economy can 
be expected to have generated a ‘generic’ targeting capability (Rodrik, 2004) 
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production and design engineering capabilities as an input in their efforts at enhancing 
competitiveness. In this they are spurred by interactive learning from user/supplier 
relationships and, less often, enlightened public policies addressing systemic failures that 
block innovative development.24 Note that the growth of experimental activities by small, 
non-R&D innovative firms does not cease during Ph-2 at all – neither they do 
subsequently, although their quality may differ.25 Particularly with the advent of new 
generic technologies and new fields of application thereof, they may get revitalized, often 
as high-tech spin-offs and start-ups.26 During Ph-2 the balance between variation, on the 
one hand, and type a selection, on the other, shifts towards the latter. Moreover in a sub-
set of cases, groups of firms comprising a proto-industry, i.e., the early stages of what 
potentially may become a new industry in Ph-3, make their appearance. Simultaneously, 
other pre-emergence conditions relevant to these industries may spring up (see below), 
some resulting from policies while others from new opportunities in the global or 
domestic environments. This will occur in a relatively small number of areas.27 
 
2.2.4. Phase 3 – Selection of Sectors and Other Multi-Agent Structures 
 
During Ph-3, selection type b, which, as suggested, may have started earlier on, begins to 
prevail. Higher-level organizations (new industries, clusters and markets) will normally 
require a measure of policy targeting. They will also rely on a systematic allocation of 
resources to a process of innovation viewed as a collective enterprise, that is, within an 
institutional and policy set up where strategic priorities are identified or re-defined. 
Systemic failures relating to finance, skills, information and coordination are tackled and 
get gradually overcome, with the public dimensions of knowledge being taken advantage 
of more fully than before. Neither new activity creation nor type a selection necessarily 
cease in Ph-3, since they are key to the renewal of cycles of structural change, regardless 
the level of income. 
 
The envelope of the three logistic curves in Figure 1 below shows the change of per 
capita income (y axis) of an economy that traverses the three phases described above (the 
x axis is time). Ph 0, or schedule J (J=0), where little if any income growth occurs over 
time, is depicted by a(n almost) flat line. 
 
Let schedule J (J=1,2,3) show income per capita as a function of time resulting 
exclusively from the typical diversification/specialization activity which occurs in phase J 
– “variation” in curve 1, (without neither type a or ‘firm level’ selection nor type b or 
‘sector selection’ having taken place), type a selection for curve 2 and type b selection in 
curve 3.  
 
Schedule 1 represents the time pattern of income per capita for an economy that does not 
manage to shift in a significant way towards firm selection, let alone sector selection. 
This may be the outcome of lack of capability building and weak policies. It lies under 
                                                                  
24 Policies underlying the rise of Embraer in Brazil and internationally competitive semiconductor firms in 
Taiwan are examples of this kind (see Cassiolato, J.E., R. Bernardew and H. Lastres, 2003 and Mathews, 
1997) 
25 For instance, the emergence of a group of innovative firms that initiate formal R&D activities may be 
stronger in Ph-2 than in Ph-1. 
26 Biosidus and INVAP, both high-tech firms from Argentina, are examples of spin-offs prompted this way. 
27 Conceivably, in some contexts, and for an even smaller subgroup of these firms, the beginning of 
emergence of a new industry may take place. Hence, some type b selection processes, which are typical of 
Ph-3, could ensue already in Ph-2 (see below). 
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the envelope or maximum output obtainable (which reflects the impact of post variation 
selection) processes. Similarly Curve Ph2 (Curve Ph3) after its intersection with Curve 
Ph1 (Curve Ph2) represents output per capita in the economy which results both from 
“full” variation and from full ‘firm selection’ (‘firm- and sector-selection). 28  
 
[Fig 1 around here] 
 
 
The deeper explanation for the existence and shape of the above schedules lies in some 
notion of creation, consolidation or maturity of the relevant multi-agent entity (sector, 
cluster, market). In Ph-1, although many firms experiment with new products, processes 
and organizational forms, very few have achieved a enough consolidation to yield a 
lasting and stable effect on output. Most firms represent fleeting phenomena, and may 
fail shortly after having started up. Similarly, in Ph-2, a measure of consolidation or 
maturity, and thereby of impact stability, is achieved at the level of individual firms, but 
not at higher levels of organization, e.g. a sector or cluster. These multi-level structures 
can attain economies of scale and advantages of intra-firm cooperation and division of 
labor latent within the prior set of organizations; and would also thereby, represent a 
stimulus for the creation of new firms. On both counts Schedule 3 should lie higher than 
Schedule 2 after a point.29 As they proceed, these evolutionary transitions give raise to 
productivity gains that get increasingly diffused across the economy over time. 
 
3. A three-phase policy perspective 
 
Each policy development phase to be reviewed next within the context of the long-term 
view of growth and structural change discussed above is characterized by a blend of three 
dimensions: namely, i. Market and system failures blocking the unaided attainment of 
such priorities; ii. Overall objectives and strategic priorities; and iii. Policy mix. 
 
These dimensions bear close relation to the structural deficiencies, weaknesses and 
opportunities of the economy. Since this is a generic model, we stress here objectives and 
priorities rather than specific policies.30 
 
3.1. Phase 1- Promoting innovation and experimentation, setting up a STE institutional 
infrastructure and establishing threshold framework conditions 
 
                                                                  
28 Schedule 2 lies below Schedule 1 to the left of the intersection of these two curves. This implies that the 
output per capita that could be generated from ‘firm selection’ when there is no systematic variation is 
lower than that which could be generated by ‘variation’ only. This is obvious since a condition for effective 
firm selection is a sufficiently broad process of ‘variation’. Similarly considerations explain why Schedule 
3 is to the left of its intersection with Schedule 2 lies below Schedule 2. 
29 In the figure the critical point is represented by the intersection of Schedule 3 with Schedule 2. The 
former lies below the latter to the left of this intersection because the successful emergence of any one 
higher level structure (‘sector selection’) may critically depend on the appearance of one or more individual 
firm with a sustainable competitive advantage, i.e. who have achieved consolidation in the relevant area. 
The more we move to the right the more firm selection has taken place and the larger the number of 
potential new sectors or industries that could emerge. 
30 For instance, important governance and regulatory policies, such as new regulatory frameworks for infant 
industry, may be needed already in Ph-2, as the Chilean case in illustrates (J. Katz, 2004). Likewise, intra 
University governance issues may also have to be tackled, such as allowing professors to set up start-ups, to 
do proprietary R&D for companies, and to share in the licensing benefits from patented technology (see 
respective 1999 legislation in France). 
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3.1.1. Structural Deficiencies, System Weaknesses and Opportunities 
 
The relative weight of the respective features (see Box 1) will vary according to country-
specific institutional and structural conditions, giving rise to variations of the generic 
case. 
 
[Box 1 around here] 
 
3.1.2. Strategic priorities, system failures and action areas 
 
As an overall goal, Ph-1 seeks to establish framework conditions for innovative 
entrepreneurship development. This will mean actions aimed at overcoming structural 
deficiencies relating both to the business sector and to the support infrastructure as shown 
in Box 2. 
 
[Box 2 around here] 
3.2 Ph-2 - Accelerating innovation and firm-level (type a) selection and creating 
conditions for future policy targeting 
 
The general goal is creating conditions for: i. Internalizing/endogenizing business 
innovation across the economy; ii. Enhancing networking and interactive learning-both 
in general and with a focus on the future international expansion of specific infant 
activities, product classes and clusters (either through market forces and/or policy 
interventions) ; and iii. Promoting a set of organizations able to seize the advantages of 
globalization (access to global markets, resources, partners). Only a few top-tier 
industrializing economies have traversed successfully Ph-2 (e.g Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan Province of China, Singapore, Israel). Most countries have stalled in this phase 
(see below). Key structural deficiencies, system weaknesses and (latent) opportunities are 
indicated in Box 3. Strategic priorities, system failures and action areas are shown in Box 
4. 
 
[Box 3 around here] 
[Box 4 around here] 
 
3.3 Phase 3: Accelerating innovation and the internationalization of the innovation 
system. Emergence of new infant industries, markets and clusters, 
 
Box 5 provides a detail of the key characteristics of the policy approach in Ph-3. Note 
that the central policy thrust in this phase is geared to new knowledge-based product 
classes, networks, sectors and innovation systems, including venture capital/private 
equity markets, the development of standards-setting activities and public/private 
partnerships, in the context of a considerable degree of exposure to global competition 
and the application of advanced targeted policies. 
 
[Box 5 around here] 
 
3.4 Variations of the general model 
 
The sequences across phases are far from regular since they do not occur evenly across 
the board and may, therefore, feature differently across countries, sectors and regions.  
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Policies may likewise vary according to specific initial conditions within each phase. 
Some countries, like Israel during the late 1960s or India and Russia today, may have 
excellent STE infrastructures, but be retarded in business innovation. In these cases, 
triggering the virtuous STE-innovation co-evolutionary process may require direct 
support to business innovation (this condition embodies the system failure addressed by 
policy). This variant of the general model assumes that the strong push to innovation 
entailed by a well-developed STE infrastructure may not suffice to trigger the required 
co-evolutionary process. What is lacking is pull i.e. “demand” or incentives by business 
firms to undertake R&D and innovation and valorize the related capabilities in their 
competitive inroads. This may come about through direct support; e.g. through specific 
subsidies business innovation. Moreover, once innovation in the business sector acquires 
momentum it will, through derived demand for S&T inputs and for skilled manpower, 
stimulate the STE infrastructure itself (hence, ‘innovation’ becomes a source of pull for 
the STE infrastructure).  
 
Conversely, in countries that lack a well-developed STE system, simply providing direct 
incentives to commercial innovation will not suffice since the STE infrastructure cannot 
respond by providing additional knowledge, technology and skilled manpower inputs. 
The system failure to be overcome by policy in this variant of the general model must 
also involve, not just direct, but also indirect support to business innovation by means of 
actions addressed to strengthening the STE infrastructure.31 
 
3.5 How endogenously driven policy is? 
 
Policy-related needs and effectiveness are strongly affected by relative advances and 
delays in the development of innovation systems’ structural features, including their 
differentiated policy capability components. However, these can hardly be expected to 
translate in automatic or purely endogenously given policy responses since, for instance, 
strategic priorities have to be determined within a number of possible alternatives, 
requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment. Moreover, a virtuous co-evolution 
process may take place between the adaptation of an innovation system to the impact of 
past policies and new policy responses to emerging opportunities.32 When innovation 
systems face radical changes in environment such co-evolution requires the guide of 
search, vision determination and strategy formulation. The latter is subject to a large 
scope of variety as well as to fundamental uncertainty and serendipity.33 This is one of 
the key reasons why differentiated policy capability development is an important 
component of innovation systems. 
 
                                                                  
31 In this case the promotion of commercial innovation requires a combination of push and pull actions.  
32 Throughout the sequence of phases cumulative processes with positive feedback are triggered and fuelled 
by the conditions created by previous phases. However, radical external challenges, such as paradigmatic 
shifts may raise new challenges and truncate the ‘natural’ evolution throughout phases or alternatively, 
create new opportunities for continuation of cumulative processes by shifting to a new ‘engine of growth’ 
(this was the case in Israel where the cumulative process initiated in the early 1970s by the direct grants to 
business sector R&D, which was weakening during the second half of the 1980s, received a big push 
forward by the policy promoting the venture capital industry/market (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008a). 
Thus, the outcome may be the start of a new cycle or the reset of a current one before its completion. 
33 Fundamental uncertainty occurs when information from past events cannot be used to form statistical 
probabilities over the outcomes of future events, since each event is distinctive and novel (Knight, 1921). 
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Tapping the international policy experience according to domestic needs is another 
important feature. Skills to do so remain poor and un-addressed in most of the developing 
world -- this being hardly offset by means foreign policy advise. This is the reason why 
many attempts to draw on such experience end up in failure. The point is engaging less in 
viewing the domestic development issues in the light of the experience of successful 
catching-up countries as is often done and more in assessing the latter’s experience in the 
light of the specific circumstances of the countries that fail to catch-up, with due attention 
paid to initial capability endowments and to the underpinnings of the ensuing capability 
building dynamic (see Sercovich and Dolun, 2005 and Sercovich et al., 1999, especially 
chapter 1).  
 
Assessing policy needs and efficacy entails, first of all, identifying and addressing 
systemic failures in the current institutional set-up that block capability building along 
strands conducive to the development of dynamic comparative advantages. Non-market 
institutions are at the core of such institutional set-up (Nelson 2005). This includes most 
of the institutions of the knowledge-subsystem (regulatory agencies, training institutions, 
universities, technical associations and so on). These advance along their own tracks of 
capability accumulation – as do differentiated policy capabilities – and have a decisive 
impact on socio-economic outcomes, over and above whatever the self-transformational 
properties of market systems are. 
 
3.6. Success and Failure in Transitioning to Ph-334 
 
In this section we first briefly address transition and emergence issues with a focus on 
entry into Ph-3. We distinguish two basic stylized models of successful emergence of 
multi-agent structures (MAS) such as those consisting of new product classes, markets, 
industries or clusters in the transition to Ph-3. To one we call “market-selection driven”; 
to the other “science and technology-led”. Then we examine cases of success and failure 
in entering Ph-3. 
 
3.6.1. Market-selection driven emergence 
 
This case is based on market selection of the most competitive firms in Ph-2. One 
example is that of venture capital firms and start-ups that originated in Israel in the 
1980’s and early 1990’s prior to (or during the early) emergence of that country’s venture 
capital industry/market & the entrepreneurial high-tech cluster, which they ended up 
being part of. These firms were then leveraged into multi-agent structure (which laid the 
ground of the evolutionary targeting concept (Avnimelech and Teubal 2008, Sercovich 
and Teubal 2007). Another example of ‘market selection’ at the firm level is ARCOR, a 
highly integrated Argentine candy and chocolate multinational that competes head-to-
head with the leading multinationals in the sector such as Nabisco Holdings Corp and 
Cadbury Schweppes PLC. This firm was instrumental in consolidating an internationally 
oriented, highly competitive candy and chocolate product class in Argentina. In contrast 
with the key role to be played by government-promoted entrepreneurial high-tech cluster 
in the case of the development of the venture capital industry in Israel, ARCOR’s case is 
a much clear-cut case of ‘market selection driven’ emergence, i.e. in its unremitting 
technological progress and raising quality standards, ARCOR hardly drew on the 
domestic STE infrastructure. 
                                                                  
34 This section heavily relies on a draft by the authors with the provisional title “Two models of policy 
targeting with factual/counterfactual illustrations” (forthcoming) 
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3.6.2. STE-led emergence 
 
This variant is based on the successful development of a technology-specific 
infrastructure that ‘nurses’ key precursor firms, which then get metamorphosed into a 
new sector or industry. A good example of this kind is Taiwan’s semiconductor industry 
during the 1980’s. In this case, the initial firms originated as spin-offs of the state-
sponsored Electronics Research and Service Organization (ERSO), which absorbed and 
then transferred US integrated circuit technology, helping to train manpower and launch 
start-ups by means of the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). Another 
example is that of the Brazilian enterprise Embraer, which was formed by professionals 
trained by a state-sponsored S&T institution (the Aeronautics Engineering School, which 
in 1946 became the Aeronautics Technology Institute -- ITA in Portuguese) and then 
massively transferred to Embraer, subsequently becoming the human capital backbone 
for the initial stages of this successful Brazilian-based multinational aircraft 
manufacturer. 
 
As implicitly suggested already, the distinction between market-selection driven 
emergence and STE-led emergence often is not absolute since certain science and 
technology thresholds may have to be reached in Ph-2 for the market selection driven 
emergence of a MAS to take place. Thus, for example, Israel's defense R&D and general 
excellence in STE during the 1980’s & 1990’s gave rise to technological and innovation 
capabilities that laid the ground for ‘firm selection’ in software and communications and 
the emergence, along with venture capital firms, of the entrepreneurial high-tech cluster 
in the 1990s. This suggests the potential importance of hybrid or mixed cases of Ph-3 
MAS emergence 
 
Clearly, STE-led emergence of multi-agent structures in Ph-3, as opposed to that resulting 
from the unaided action of market forces, entails a degree of (direct, indirect) policy 
targeting. But even in the second case, where policy targeting of new multi-agent 
structures is absent, past policies may be influential in creating the required Ph-2 pre-
conditions for subsequent emergence. 
 
Another relevant factor is system complexity. Broadly speaking, the higher the systemic 
complexity of the activity at stake (number and variety of inter-agent knowledge flows 
required to bring a product successfully to the market) the greater the role of the STE and 
network infrastructure to cope with systemic failures (35). The extent of system 
complexity may result from globalization-induced emergence of numerous interacting 
markets along with the logistics resulting from the geographical fragmentation of the 
value chain of complex products. That of ‘integrated circuits production services market’, 
is an example provided by Taiwan’s experience with its infant integrated circuit industry, 
which emerged during the early to middle-1980’s. This enabled suppliers of innovative 
chips worldwide to focus on chip design while outsourcing production services to 
Taiwanese firms. 
 
The interaction between market selection, policy targeting and system complexity gives 
raise to multiple possible sector-specific patterns. 
 
                                                                  
35 The concept of complexity above is akin to, although it differs from, that of complex product systems 
(CoPS) see http://www.cops.ac.uk/workprogramme/ourworkprogramme.php (accessed on 10 June 2008). 
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3.6.3. Success and Failure (Retardation and Truncation) 
 
Successful cases of policy-targeted MAS emergence in the developing world are rare – 
and clearly out-numbered by cases of failure (retardation or truncation). The comparison 
between the experiences of Brazil (Embraer) and Taiwan (semiconductors) poses 
suggestive commonalities and lend themselves to a provisional generalization of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for entry into Ph3, entailing the concomitant 
development of MAS and generic targeting capabilities. These commonalities are 
reviewed further below.  
 
The review of the evidence of failed and successful policy-targeted (and of unaided 
emergence) of MAS, including dynamic policy trajectories and outcomes possibly 
involved can be approached by focusing on: (i) Initial conditions; (ii) Incentives policies; 
(iii) Strategy for IS formation (including policy targeting); (iv) Business strategy and (v) 
Outcomes. What follows is a preliminary exploration along these lines, with focus on 
policy-targeted cases.36 
  
Boxes 6-a and 6-b provide a detailed illustration of truncation versus emergence in the 
aircraft industry and venture capital industry, respectively, and spell out the 
factual/counterfactual variables and scenarios at play. 
 
[Box 6-a around here] 
 
A parallel case to Brazil’s Embraer is that of ERSO/ITRI (Electronic Research Service 
Organization/Indutrial Technology Research Intitute) in Taiwan. In this case, a massive 
spinoff of personnel from these organizations during the early 1980’s laid the ground for 
the creation of enterprises, including the two most successful in the semiconductors field. 
These companies started the global 'production outsourcing' market, thus allowing the 
emergence of 'fabless' enterprises focused on chip design (Israel had some 25 of these 
companies towards the late 1990’s. ERSO 'targeted' semiconductor technology e and 
implemented technology transfer (based on an agreement with RCA of the US), 
nourishing in-house learning prior to ‘releasing’ its personnel to set up the spin-off 
enterprises. These two cases thus mark an interesting commonality across successful 
transition cases, characterized by the early tackling of systemic failures relating to 
information, technology and coordination by means of the creation of critical nodes 
within an emerging innovation system and in the framework of long enough planning 
horizons (see Sercovich and Teubal, forthcoming).  
 
[Box 6-b around here] 
 
4. Fundamentals underlying the Innovation and Technology Policy Phases 
 
In this section we spell out some general principles underlying the perspective discussed 
above. The concept of policy trajectory whereby early policies are linked to later policies 
                                                                  
36 Illustration may also be offered of sustainability versus non-sustainability upon Ph-3 having been reached 
(or some variante thereof) for the case of advanced industrial countries such as in automobiles and 
consumer electronics in the US. Quite possibly, the predominant factual in the developing world is one of 
truncation in Ph-1/Ph-2 due to premature selection. The case of successful catching-up countries and that of 
other countries that managed to access Ph-3 in specific activities would provide an exceptional factual, 
whose stylization yields our generic counterfactual. 
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and where the objective is to generate self-sustained processes of knowledge and 
innovation-based growth is key in this discussion. 
 
4.1 General Principles.  
 
4.1.1. The Framing of innovation, technology and venture capital policies 
 
To tackle the effective application of new policy perspectives, policy-makers need to pay 
adequate attention to the framing of policies; that is, the cognitive structures required and 
the (political, governance) constraints and opportunities involved in exposure to 
globalization. This is made vital by a dynamic and increasingly complex global 
environment and is illustrated below by reference to policies in support of enterprise 
innovation. 
 
Traditionally such policies have sought generating more innovation or R&D in the 
business sector (so called “Business Sector R&D additionality” objective); the 
assumption being that more R&D in firms will automatically translate into more output 
and value added. However, under current world economy conditions this assumption 
cannot be taken for granted since the medium and long term impact will depend not just 
on the future state of global markets and global competition, but also on the capacity to 
access critical complementary assets (Teece 1986), including sources of critical resources 
in advanced economies, such as venture capital. Moreover, in turbulent global 
environments domestic firms also need to develop innovation capabilities in order to re-
orient and upgrade their innovative efforts in response to changed technological and 
market conditions 37. 
 
Finally, adding considerably to the complexity of policy framing efforts, the policy 
trajectory over time, including forthcoming policies, may exert a non-negligible influence 
on the total impact of policies already under implementation. Thus the indirect impacts 
suggested above will also depend on future policies directed to the STE infrastructure. 
These may help leverage the new capabilities, the new entrepreneurs and the new 
knowledge relating to areas with potential high-growth generated by current policies. The 
upshot is that policy framing should nowadays precede the design and implementation 
both of policies and of policy evaluations (see below). 
 
4.1.2. Emergence as a possible innovation/technology policy objective  
 
This follows from the relative increase in importance of sector-level (type b) selection in 
Ph-3. From this perspective, the objective of policy is to trigger and sustain a process of 
emergence of a new multi-agent entity (sector, sub-branch of the business sector, market, 
cluster). Emergence of new activities or clusters might be characterized as a cumulative 
process with positive feedback.38 Triggering and sustaining such a process may require 
targeted rather than horizontal policies39.  
                                                                  
37 In the longer term the indirect impact of direct support of firms’ innovation may also depend on its 
impact on innovative entrepreneurship and (as mentioned in the previous section) on the creation of sets of 
firms able to achieve sustainable competitive advantages (type a selection), thus eventually laying the basis 
for new industries and markets (type b selection). 
38 Alternatively it could be stated that emergence is characterized by dynamic increasing returns; see also 
Bresnahan et al., 2001 
39 Horizontal rather than targeted policies are appropriate to promote ‘variation’ (Teubal, 1997). For this 
reason they should be a component of Ph-1’s policy mix.  
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4.1.3. Evolutionary Targeting 40 
 
The objective of targeted programs is to trigger and sustain sufficiently rapid processes of 
emergence of higher-level organizations and multi-agent structures. In the present 
context, targeting differs radically both from the ‘picking winner’ policies of the past and 
from the industrial policies followed by the Republic of Korea during the 1970s (hence 
the term evolutionary targeting).  
 
This new perspective focuses on generating pre-emergence conditions for a set of multi-
agent structures; selection of potential targets; identification of system failures blocking 
unaided emergence; and the design and implementation of targeted programs. Firm-level, 
type a, selection or the appearance of firms with sustainable competitive advantages can 
be a major pre-emergence condition. 
 
4.1.4. Intermediation Issues 
 
A new (supply-demand) intermediation form is a pre-emergence condition for the 
creation of a new market and/or the emergence of a new industry. Three types of 
conditions are involved: I) Dominant Product Design (originally raised in Industry Life 
Cycle theory, see Abernathy and Utterback 1978, in their framework a condition for the 
transition from the Fluid to the Growth phase of a new industry); 2) Product Bundling 
issues due to economies of scale in market building and in transactions costs (see 
Antonelli and Teubal 2007 in the context of the ICT related venture capital 
industry/market); and 3) Mutual adaptation of supply and demand agents and the 
institutional framework. All of these require process of experimentation and learning (or 
alternatively variation and selection); and frequently both a favorable environment and 
explicit pre-emergence policies. As a result, the evolutionary targeting perspective needs 
in some instances to focus on: (i) generating new intermediation forms and other pre-
emergence conditions for some industries/markets; and (ii) triggering (and sustaining) 
emergence processes in other industries/markets. This applies to venture capital policies 
in Europe (OECD, 2003). An interesting instance of evolutionary targeting was the 
Yozma program – a targeted program directed to the emergence of a domestic venture 
capital industry/market in Israel during 1993-98.  
 
4.2. Towards a Typology of Policies – The Innovation/Technology Policy Mix 
 
Innovation/technology policies include a variety of measures belonging to one or more of 
the following three categories: incentive programs, institutional and regulatory changes, 
and other policy actions/measures. 
 
Incentive programs are of two general types – horizontal and targeted. Frequently a mix 
of more than one innovation/T policy category is required e.g. incentives programs cum 
institutional changes, since there may be complementary or substitutes. Moreover, the 
implementation of incentives programs may require attention not only to monetary 
incentives but also to capabilities, organization, strategy, etc. While in some cases 
promoting emergence may be implemented through institutional changes or horizontal 
incentives programs, targeting the new multi-agent structures may frequently be required.  
 
                                                                  
40 See Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006a, 2007 
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Targeting the emergence of higher levels of organization sharply differs with respect to 
the targeted policies of the past, including those involved in ‘picking winners’.41 A 
systemic view directed to new sectors or infant activities may have to include both 
activity-directed policies and activity-relevant policies. Thus targeting a venture capital 
industry/market may require both policies directed to stimulate venture capital or venture 
capital organizations and policies directed e.g. to promote innovation or innovative 
SME’s or high tech Start up companies  
 
4.2.1. Levels of policy making  
 
The strategic level of policy, as opposed to the operational, may require a set of 
capabilities very different to those of most existing policy institutions. It involves the 
following activities: (i) Setting (new) strategic priorities, including new multi-agent 
structures; ii. Identifying system failures; and iii. Initial articulation (along with the 
operational level in charge of policy/program implementation) in generating a new policy 
portfolio reflecting the above.  
 
The importance of the strategic level of policy increases with the rate of change in the 
global environment, its complexity and with countries’ targeting-related needs. With the 
dynamic and even turbulent environment most countries face today, the possibility that 
existing programs/policies may not reflect updated, true strategic priorities anymore is 
high. The implication is that a re-assessment of these priorities becomes a critical policy 
action, much more than continuing the routine implementation of existing programs. 
 
Thus not just the capabilities but also the organizational set up, the activities and the 
routines comprising the strategic level of policy, can be very different from those 
characterizing the policy institutions of most countries. While good links with the 
operational level of policy are key, it is also important that the governance profile assure 
independence of the strategic level with respect to the operational level of policy 
 
4.3. The Context Specificity of Innovation/Technology Policy and Policy Heterogeneity  
 
Policies cannot be derived from general principles only since they require sufficient 
knowledge of the institutional and other context-specific variables, including innovation 
system components upon which the policy will impinge (and be impinged upon). Thus, a 
situation of insufficient innovation in the business sector does not necessarily imply the 
desirability of providing incentives, nor does it imply that a specific incentives-program 
be undertaken. Very much will depend on context specificities (thus, widespread 
corruption may preclude providing direct incentives to firms) and on the possibility of 
generating dynamic economies of scale e.g. through the promotion not only of innovation 
but also innovation capabilities, innovative organizations and innovative entrepreneurship 
(this may depend on business culture, the existence of critical mass of agents willing to 
benefit from the program, and the approach to program implementation which the agency 
in charge will or could adopt). One outcome is policy heterogeneity. In the venture 
capital area, the policies to be implemented in Europe may depend on the underlying 
sector/cluster whose innovative SME’s would benefit (high tech, life sciences or non-
high tech); on the possibilities of adopting particular organizational forms (e.g. limited 
partnerships were possible in the US and Israel but not possible in Finland); on pre-
existing links with the global VC industry; on whether or not a critical mass of high tech 
                                                                  
41 Targeting also involves a process diametrically opposed to those underlying horizontal policies. 
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start up companies already existed; and on whether or not there was an incumbent private 
equity industry already operating in the country or region. 
 
4.4. Policy Promotion of Virtuous, Self-Sustaining Processes  
 
The ultimate implication of the new approach to policy making proposed here is viewing 
policy as a differentiated system and process whose ultimate objective is promoting self-
sustained processes of innovation and growth. Part of this task consists of triggering and 
sustaining a cumulative process involving dynamic economies of scale mentioned above; 
another part is the forging of explicit links among policies through time and across 
phases.  
 
We briefly refer to two central axes of policy making: 1) promoting STE-Innovation co-
evolution; and 2) linking direct promotion of innovation in the business sector and direct 
promotion of BS innovation policies and policies directed to the STE infrastructure with 
the subsequent support of venture capital and/or targeting of other multi-agent structures. 
 
The first linkage exploits the supply push-demand pull links between innovation and its 
supporting STE infrastructure; the second implies a substitution of privately financed 
support of innovation and innovative SME’s for government support (Avnimelech and 
Teubal 2006), calling for the creation of additional, mostly private (venture capital) 
infrastructures to support innovative SME’s.  
 
5. Applying the framework: new policy challenges 
 
The following sub-sections are intended to illustrate the issues previously discussed in the 
light of specific fields of application, all of which are characterized by the key role played 
by non-market institutions in the evolution of IS. 
 
5.1. Standards, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Technological Change: the 
Interplay between Diversity and Selection 
 
Standards and IPRs play a leading role in shaping of innovation systems. Historically, 
both institutions advanced pari passu with the development of innovation systems in 
today’s advanced industrial countries. Only since approximately the last third of the 19th 
century, their respective national regimes slowly began converging. This process reached 
a peak in 1995 with the approval of the WTO agreements on Trade-Related IPRs 
(TRIPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, the evolution did not stop 
there. During the last decade, additional international agreements and, particularly, new 
regional and bilateral free trade agreements considerably sped up the pace of institutional 
(as opposed to economic) convergence across borders, involving most developing 
countries. As a consequence, factoring in the role of standards and IPRs has become 
indispensable for a proper understanding of the process of innovation system formation 
and development in catching-up economies, including the policy dimensions.  
 
Because of their built-in ambivalence, depending on how the respective regimes are 
designed, managed and enforced, technical standards and IPRs may spur or stifle 
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innovative activity. It is a very fine line indeed, one that needs permanent monitoring and 
context-specific co-adaptation – something often neglected by international guidelines.42 
 
Technical standards help focus the direction of collective search efforts and help foster 
diffusion; but they also may limit the emergence and adoption of new technologies and 
products, e.g. through lock-in effects. They encourage efficiency gains from 
specialization, reduce information asymmetries, drive costs and prices down and enlarge 
markets; but they also limit product diversity and users’ range of potential choices. 
 
In developing country contexts international standards tend to become functional once 
exposure to international competition gains strength (Ph-2), calling for fine-tuned 
public/private co-operation in order to build conformity capabilities and take full 
advantage of standards diffusion. As the opening of the economy proceeds and 
competition in domestic markets increases, the need arises to watch the balance between 
gains in the efficiency of innovative efforts and reductions in the degree of diversity of 
these efforts.  
 
These policy challenges are not at all trivial. For instance, a specific new technology may 
have a lower potential for improvement than an old one the former comes to replace, or 
the costs of shifting to a new, more promising technology, may be perceived as higher 
than those of sticking to the old one. As policy-makers are rarely able to anticipate 
technological change and time their decisions optimally, they are normally focused on 
creating appropriate framework conditions for standardization and rely on private 
committees to manage the standards-setting processes. This entails fostering the diffusion 
of innovative capabilities and networking in enterprises and client-oriented conformity-
related capabilities in the institutional support infrastructure. 
 
On the other hand, and depending on the scope, strength, duration and ways of 
enforcement, patents pose a well-know trade-off between rewarding invention and 
innovation and securing the diffusion of new knowledge. The kind of incentives they 
provide differs sharply from those given by standards. Whereas the latter encourage 
collective and participatory processes of innovation convergence, patents are publicly 
sanctioned private monopolies given in exchange for making the respective information 
public. In principle, their roles are complementary; one promoting selection, the other 
fostering diversity. And yet, their specific impact is highly context-specific and may be at 
odds with what is expected from them. Thus, for instance, when innovative capabilities 
are underdeveloped (e.g., Ph-1), a strong patent regime may encourage premature 
selection thereby discriminating against domestic firms (particularly SMEs) while 
asymmetrically favoring well-established, R&D-intensive, advanced country-based 
companies at the expense of potentially competitive domestic firms. Correspondingly, an 
exceedingly lopsided distribution of technical, managerial and organizational capabilities 
across enterprises may also substantially prevent reaping the potential collective benefits 
from standardization.  
 
With the integration of world markets, the diffusion of (largely company-sponsored) 
standardization and strong IPR regimes in open catching up economies tend to get ahead 
                                                                  
42 For instance, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was set up in 1967 to promote 
innovation by means of IPR regimes, in disregard of development-specific contexts. It is only very recently 
that a ‘Development Agenda’ for WIPO began being discussed at the behest of a group of developing 
countries. 
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of the maturation process of domestic institutions. Where weak innovation systems and 
lacking self-regulatory mechanisms are the rule, as is the case in most countries still in 
Ph-1, such diffusion may be expected to distort and prevent, rather than help, innovative 
development. As innovation system mature, however, the possibility of reaping network 
externalities and capitalizing on rewards to innovative effort increases, which broadens 
the scope for the direct and indirect effects of interface standards and for drawing on IPR 
protection to strengthen international competitiveness.43  
 
The introduction of quality and safety standards may offset lacking company reputation 
by reducing information asymmetries and gaining market acceptance for new products. 
This way, good standards management may speed up Ph-2 transition. Similarly, with the 
progressive spread of innovative effort, IPRs may help capitalizing on it, particularly if 
the IPR regime protects the kind of innovative outputs that are typical of catching up 
economies. Looking forward to Ph-3, active participation in standard-setting processes 
calls for inroads in knowledge generation by means of systematic engagement in 
collective, and increasingly R&D-based, innovative activity. Similar reasoning applies 
with regard to patents, which nowadays reward above all those able to turn out the 
outputs of highly R&D- and science-intensive inventive and innovative effort.44 
 
5.2. Food security 
 
Competitiveness in agricultural and food products is increasingly about the ability to 
meet safety, quality, and environmental requirements (over and above price and terms of 
delivery). Changes in how the risks involved in the food chain are perceived by the public 
and approached by the scientific and policy-making community have resulted during the 
last decade or so in steeply more stringent sanitary and phytosanitary standards and 
regulations in all developed and many developing country markets.45 Greater scrutiny of 
production and processing techniques is being coupled by stricter traceability and 
                                                                  
43 In the drug development field a stronger IP regime may help ethical drug developers (who undertake 
substantial R&D and clinical testing of new drugs) at the expense of existing developing country based 
companies that might have thrived under prior, weaker IP regimes (see Sercovich, 2008). 
44 China’s case is worth watching from this perspective. China aims to become a world S&T and standards-
setting leader by 2020, which means having entered fully into Ph-3 in a variety of fronts within just over a 
decade. The idea is to strengthen the competitiveness of Chinese firms by capturing the value from 
successful R&D to build up inter-operable technical standards embedded in Chinese-held patents. This 
reveals full understanding that competition is moving upstream from product-markets to IPR-embedded, 
WTO-compatible, standards. Active participation in standard-setting activity is seen as lowering both the 
risks of research and the costs of development as well as decreasing the time-to-market delivery of new 
products. The path to this goal is anything but smooth. In Nov 2003 China announced the adoption of a 
home-grown encryption standards for wireless communications (WIPI) to be adhered to by all wireless 
devices sold in China (allegedly superior to the American IEEE standard 802.11i. In April 2004, faced with 
allegations of non-WTO compliance, China announces the suspension of the requirements. Between Dec 
2004 and Feb 2005, two meetings are convened to bridge differences. Both fail. In March 2006, at the end 
of highly contended and acrimonious negotiations, the International Standards Organization (ISO) rules in 
favour of the American standard. In Dec 2005 China announces preferential treatment in government 
procurement for WAPI-compliant devices and a new WAPI industrial alliance of Chinese firms to promote 
the standard. Other high profile Chinese standards initiatives include third generation mobile telephony 
(TD-SCDMA), product tracking and remote identification (RFID), digital audio-video coding and decoding 
(AVS) and formats of audio-video disc players (EDV).  
45 Sanitary and phytosanitary laws, regulations, requirements and procedures are intended to protect human, 
animal and plant health. They comprise end-product criteria, processes and production methods, inspection, 
certification and approval procedures, quarantine treatments and transportation requirements, sampling 
procedures, risk assessment methods and labelling requirements directly related to food safety (WTO, SPS 
Agreement).  
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labeling requirements along the supply chain. In particular, the European public has 
become highly sensitized to uncertainties surrounding potential risks entailed in 
genetically modified food.46 
 
These circumstances have led to a considerable increase in the threshold technological, 
managerial and organizational capability required in all developing countries, across the 
board, regardless of the extent of maturation of their domestic innovation system. 
Correspondingly, the pose additional demands for offsetting S&T and innovation 
capability building and public/private cooperation policies in pursuit of a moving target 
as a matter of policy priority. Therefore, it is not surprising that uneven responses are 
found amongst agricultural commodity and food supplying countries, even those at 
comparable stages of innovation system maturation as a result of context-specific 
circumstances. While posing a significant challenge, sometimes perceived as a barrier to 
trade, those demands also mean a powerful inducement for technological upgrading and 
entry into higher-value added food exports. The respective costs depend on the prevailing 
level of administrative, managerial and scientific capabilities, the scope for public/private 
partnership, and the strength of the existing S&T support infrastructure, including 
extension services.47  
 
During Ph-1 only the rudiments of the necessary capabilities to meet sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures are in place. They may include, save in a very narrow 
range of heavily export oriented activities, a bare minimum capacity to monitor sanitary 
conditions and little or none compliance infrastructure and capability to interact with the 
international system to build legitimacy while enhancing the domestic knowledge base. 
Large export opportunities may thus be forgone. The importance of these SPS 
capabilities particularly in less developed economies (where agriculture and food 
industries are important) is such that there may well be a need for a specific policy 
targeted to promote them and the associated underpinnings (this may also need to be part 
of a very basic set of ‘framework conditions’ which every country must possess in order 
to be able to effectively participate in a virtuous innovation based growth trajectory). The 
need for this kind of targeting already in Ph-1 targeting may be even more compelling for 
those countries who already have export oriented, natural resource based food sectors 
particularly as the SPS measures are becoming more and more stringent through time.48  
 
In Ph-2, broader reactive capabilities are developed to prevent a growing gap with respect 
to evolving SPS measures in export markets. At this stage, some key elements of the 
basic infrastructure are introduced and begin interacting. Awareness building is pursued 
                                                                  
46 This has led to the European Union’s widespread application of the so-called precautionary principle, 
according to which in case of absence of scientific consensus on the potential harmful effects of an action, 
such as that of introducing genetically modified organisms in agricultural production, the burden of proof 
falls on those who have taken the action. The precautionary principle was originally introduced in the EC 
Treaty with respect to the environment but later extended to other fields, notably that of food security. 
47 The inability to comply with SPS measures may mean fairly substantial losses either in forgone exports 
or in reduced export prices. For instance, outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in 2000/2001 meant some 
$1.2 billion in forgone Argentine exports, a country that, in many respect, may be regarded as having 
entered Ph-2. Similarly, Argentina would be incurring losses of up to $ 1 billion per year due to sanitary 
problems that force that country to accept lower prices. 
48 An additional benefit of early targeting of SPS is that the new capabilities and infrastructure may 
underpin other food and food-related products and sub-branches where the country has strong, potential 
competitive advantages which can materialize, say, in Ph-2. By targeting these types of capabilities early in 
the innovation based growth process, countries may generate a capacity for the evolutionary targeting of a 
spectrum of food product classes and sub-branches in Ph-2.  
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as to the need to enlist the support of the STE-innovation infrastructure and R&D 
activities in order to keep up with the scientific and technological frontier in the food 
safety domain. 
 
More specifically, this phase entails steps towards:  
 
i. Building policy-making capabilities, including updating of legislation to enable 
food safety control agencies to respond to current challenges beyond basic control 
o hygiene; 
ii. Setting and fine-tuning of public-private cooperation networks for the effective 
functioning of the food safety system and supporting private participation in 
international standards-setting activities;  
iii. Strengthening technological capability within the institutions of the domestic 
knowledge sub-system, particularly those of the food standards and quality 
control agencies, through investments for technical training and to upgrade their 
testing and measurement, risk analysis and certification capacity, R&D efforts, 
ICT resources, training and organizational changes for enhance performance; and  
iv. Helping to build capabilities in the private sector to deal with rising standards and 
gain sustainable competitive advantages through experimentation and new market 
formation by promoting investments in HACCP, good agricultural practices 
(GAP) and good management practices (GMP), traceability-related information 
and labeling systems and uptake of environmental technologies. 
 
Note that all of these will promote not only type a but also type b selection, i.e. new 
opportunities for the policy targeting of new food and food-related product classes.  
 
Finally, during Ph-3, proactive R&D-based capabilities take the driving seat, allowing 
progress pari passu or even in anticipation of shifts in the sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) frontier, while adapting available technologies to local conditions and transferring 
experience with knowledge-based activities to the private sector. Systemic capabilities 
also develop towards fully functioning, integrated and interactive traceability systems. 
This involves, among other things, the introduction of sophisticated tracking technologies 
and the ability to respond to growing demands by engaging in a collective innovative 
effort.49 
 
Along these phases, the quality of public/private interactions is enhanced, building on 
legitimation and trust, along with the raise of the respective sector-specific innovation 
systems. 
 
While the costs of aligning domestic food security infrastructure and practices to 
international demands are immediate and rather easy to ascertain, the pervasiveness of 
feedback mechanisms and externalities, such as those associated with traceability 
systems, makes the respective benefits much more difficult to ascertain. For this reason, 
only an autonomous policy capability, one embedded in the reality of the private sector 
but, at the same, able to respond credibly to the challenges, can be experienced to rise up 
to the task. 
 
5.3 Innovation Financing 
                                                                  
49 A modern food control agency requires, among other things, a unified system of data processing and 
information network on sanitary and phytosanitary activities, food manufacturing and transportation. 
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As a country goes across the three phases discussed above, business sector R&D 
gradually shifts from government financing (Ph-1) to self-financing (Ph-3). Two factors 
militate in this direction. First, a progressive endogenization of R&D activity as a result 
of cumulative experience and capability creation at the enterprise level, whereby such 
activity becomes progressively more important to competitive performance. Second, the 
creation of privately-owned finance and support infrastructures to service high tech start-
ups and innovative SMEs. 50 Venture capital, the generic name for this differentiated 
financial market (Lerner, 1999), entails the channeling of financial resources to 
investment in high-growth companies (or companies with a high growth potential, 
usually innovative SMEs), whether high-tech or non-high tech. Success in this process is 
associated with a substantial expansion of business sector R&D and innovation, including 
an increase in business sector R&D in total national R&D, and an increase in R&D in 
GNP. 
 
Shifting from a Ph-1 pattern of finance of R&D to a Ph-3 pattern raises the toughest 
challenge. Previous research has emphasized that countries can be stalled in Ph-2. This 
calls for policy-makers to pay special attention to pre-emergence conditions in Ph-2, 
including the creation of a critical mass of innovative SMEs, thus giving rise to a demand 
for such a private infrastructure, along with international links and other external and 
domestic factors. 
 
A related aspect of an evolving innovation finance capability concerns the type of direct 
support programs to be resorted to in the various phases. Horizontal programs with a 
strong neutrality component are particularly germane to Ph-1 since, due to lack of policy 
experience in the field, policy-makers cannot know a priori the specific location of 
innovation/firm R&D related system failures (Teubal, 1997, Lall and Teubal, 1998). 
Horizontal R&D/innovation support programs are open to any firm and to any project 
undertaken by these firms (i.e. whatever the T, product class, technological area) as long 
as they are bona fide R&D/innovation projects51. Ignorance by policy makers also 
implies that at least a component of neutrality needs to be part of the incentives given by 
such horizontal programs. Neutrality in incentives may decline with experience, learning 
and capability creation both by firms and by policy makers. Thus in some areas firms 
would discover significant commercial opportunities derived from the commercialization 
of R&D and innovative activity and thus be willing to undertake it even with lower rates 
of government support. In other areas, it may found both that, although private 
profitability may be negative for some time, the potential social return is greater than 
anticipated (suggesting the convenience of increasing the rate of promotion). 
 
The trend towards a greater selectivity of incentives may thus be reinforced when 
‘targeting’ of new multi-agent structures as new product classes and sub-branches of the 
business sector, new markets or new clusters (sector, type b selection) progressively 
becomes relevant starting in Ph-2.52 Increasingly targeted incentives programs would thus 
become central to the overall government innovation support effort. 
                                                                  
50 In some case part or all of these support services are provided by foreign rather than domestic agents. A 
case in point is INTEL. Through its subsidiary Intel Capital it has provided some $4 billion to over 1000 
innovative companies in more than 30 countries since 1991 (http://www.intel.com/capital/about.htm). 
51 This condition can be termed ‘bottom up’ determination of R&D/innovation projects to be supported by 
policy.  
52 Targeting may begin already in Ph-1, provided that clear sector/area actual or potential 
comparative/competitive advantages are clearly revealed. In such cases, Ph-1 direct support should involve 
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A critical aspect of government incentives programs particularly those undertaken in Ph-
1 is identifying program objectives. It is clear that the objective is to generate or trigger 
cumulative growth processes both within each phase and across phases. Thus a focus on 
capabilities and on the promotion of innovative entrepreneurship (rather than simply on 
innovation additionality) in Ph-1 is crucial; since only thus can dynamic increasing 
returns eventually result and, as part of it, the endogenous growth of R&D and innovation 
take hold. However, a continuation of this dynamic may have to wait a successful shift to 
Ph-3, that is, once venture capital support emerges, either domestically or served by a 
global industry. Hence, to avoid getting stalled in Ph-2, continued support to a self-
sustained process of innovation growth will entail continued adjustments to the programs 
directly supporting innovation and R&D in the business sector. Changes of focus or 
objectives over time may also be required. 53 
 
6. Summary and closing remarks 
 
We have dealt with both the positive and the normative sides of a four phase, rather 
generic, evolutionary model of economic development and structural change, one which 
will hopefully lead to a new perspective on capability development and on science, 
technology, education and innovation policies in industrializing economies. While there 
are similarities with other evolutionary phase models of economic development, which 
were inspired in the experience of specific countries such as the Republic of Korea and 
Israel (see references in text) there are also important differences such as a more 
elaborated, generic link between the ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ aspects and the 
incorporation of a Phase 0 (characterized among other things by one or more low level 
‘traps’) to the standard three phase model of the literature. 
 
The sections on the positive side draws on Imbs and Wacziarg’s model of growth and 
structural change where, after a Phase 0, a phase of diversification characterizes 
industrializing economies prior to the onset of specialization. We have reformulated that 
model in terms of a post Phase 0, three-phase evolutionary framework. Variation in 
innovation (products, processes, organization, strategy, business models, areas) is the 
dominant evolutionary process in Ph-1 while ‘selection/development’ tends to prevail in 
Ph-2 (firm or type a selection) and Ph-3 (higher order or type b selection). In this model 
firm selection i.e. the emergence of a small number of highly capable firms acceding to 
sustainable competitive advantages in particular areas is the basis for structural change 
eventually leading to the emergence of multi-agent structures such as new product 
classes, branches of industry, markets or clusters in Ph-3 (an example of the latter is 
Israel’s venture capital industry and entrepreneurial high tech cluster of the 1990s. The 
transition, however, is not at all automatic; it also depends on the policy-induced creation 
of appropriate pre-emergence conditions and of appropriate targeted policy timing, 
design and implementation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
a mix of horizontal and targeted programs. The share of support through in targeted programs in such mix 
is likely to increase over time (although this may hold under very turbulent environments and cataclysmic 
events) 
53 A subtle change of objective in Ph-2 from support of R&D projects in firms to support of innovative 
SME’s has been observed in Israel. Full expression of the latter objective required going beyond 
adjustments in the existing horizontal support program -- eventually leading to the identification of venture 
capital as the focus of policy targeting in Ph-3). 
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The ‘normative’ dual of the above framework of analysis is also a post Phase 0, three-
phase policy model where policies are linked through time and where opportunities for 
structural change themselves result from phase-specific, differentiated, policies. Thus, for 
instance, the capacity to target new ‘activities in Ph-3 will depend on the development of 
generic targeting capabilities starting in Ph-2. This requires actions aimed at creating a 
strategic level of policy, one focused on the identification of strategic priorities and their 
articulation, partly through the identification of system failures, in terms of a new 
portfolio of incentive programs, institutional changes and other policy actions.  
 
The upshot of our analysis is further reinforcing the importance of adopting a new, 
systems evolutionary perspective to STE and innovation policies. This perspective is 
based on a series of general principles e.g. the need for policy framing, the notions of 
policy trajectory and evolutionary targeting, ‘emergence’ as a policy objective, a 
distinction between the ‘strategic’ and the ‘operational’ levels of policy; and the focus on 
triggering and sustaining self-sustaining processes of innovation through time.  
 
Our paper also illustrates some key challenges, constraints and opportunities involved 
both, within and across phases, in the light of selected areas of intervention (IPRs, 
standards, food security and innovation financing). These applications suggest that the 
phased approach adopted here is a useful device to enhance understanding and guide 
policy towards structural change in increasingly knowledge-driven economies. 
Admittedly, this paper submits a first attempt at developing such an approach. More 
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o.  Simple reproduction prevails 
i. Diversity generation prevails 
ii. Selection ‘type a’ prevails 
iii. Selection ‘type b’ prevails 
T 
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Box 1.  
Phase-1: Structural Deficiencies, System Weaknesses and (Latent) Opportunities 
 
• Very limited entrepreneurial capabilities and business engagement in innovation.  
• Missing innovative networks. 
• Inexistent markets for innovative products and services. 
• Acute shortage of resources for innovation. 
• Domestic products and services afflicted by reputation disadvantages. 
• Inexistent or under-performing institutions of the support infrastructure, albeit 
some of them may gain a head start in certain sectors (such as agriculture). 
• Paucity of laboratory, STE and training capabilities. 
• Shortage of policy capabilities, especially for effective policy targeting and for 
capability needs assessment.  




Box 2. A.  
Phase 1: Overcoming structural deficiencies in the business sector 
 
1. Technology transfer and wide diffusion of innovative and R&D activity in the 
business sector, including adoption and dissemination of new technologies 
and applied R&D, without discriminating against (or actually favoring) SMEs; 
2. Learning to innovate (including collective learning), capability development 
and innovative entrepreneurship 
3. Fostering broad experimentation (thus generating ‘variation’) with different 
types of innovation, firms, strategies, business development models, activities, 
technologies, etc 
4. Creating a significant segment of innovative firms across the board, including 
SMEs 
5. Promoting the emergence and development of sectors or product classes with 
perceivable sustainable competitive advantages 
 
Box 2. B. Phase 1 Supporting STE infrastructure and framework conditions 
 
1. Ensure the establishment and effective operation of a basic set of STE 
institutions and capabilities. 
2. Creating/adapting a network of technology and innovation support institutes 
geared to supporting current and, especially future needs of the innovative 
SME sector 
3. Promoting a mission-oriented technological infrastructure in a small number 
of areas of vital importance to the economy (e.g., those relating to major 
export activities) 
4. Selective and phased liberalization and opening up and nurturing of 























Box 3.  
Phase-2: Structural Deficiencies, System Weaknesses and (Latent) Opportunities 
 
• Unstructured islands of business innovation activity, including some SMEs, with 
few points of contact between them and with elements of the emerging domestic 
knowledge subsystem. 
 
• Firms in some productive sub-sectors acquire capabilities and legitimacy in 
world markets and/or the ability to identify innovation-based business 
opportunities, laying the ground for the acquisition of sustainable competitive 
advantages. 
 
• Firms in new lines of activity emerge embedded in sector-specific innovation 
systems, featuring special links with universities and the support infrastructure, 
thus acquiring the ability to react to current challenges. 
 














































Box 4. Ph-2: Strategic priorities, system failures and action Areas 
 
1. Accelerating innovation 
 
• Promoting innovation capabilities & generic R&D in the business sector, preferably jointly w/STE 
institutions. 
• Attaining a critical mass of innovative SMEs 
• Promoting co-operation and networking in the business sector and between it and supporting 
institutions e.g. universities, technology centers, government labs. 
• Promoting conformity with international standards through public/private partnerships 
 
2. Catalyzing firm-level (type-a) selection 
 
• Identifying SMEs & other firms w/already attained sustainable competitive advantages in their 
respective areas 
• Designing/starting initial implementation of new programs to reinforce innovation and associated 
firm-specific capabilities 
 
3. Triggering and Sustaining the Co-evolution of Innovation and the STE infrastructure 
 
• Developing of technological extension activities in ever closer interaction with business enterprises 
and with sectors or areas with potential sustainable competitive advantages 
• Increasing focus of university/skill formation institutions on meeting demands from innovative 
businesses, both in general and in selected areas and technologies. 
• Launching university-industry R&D Link programs 
 
4. Promoting pre-emergence conditions for multi-agent structures 
 
• Promoting ‘generic’ infrastructures sought to sustain future policy targeting of new sectors, product 
classes, clusters etc 
• Creating and spreading international links and networks, e.g. bi-national R&D support programs, 
expanding grants for studies abroad, developing diaspora networks, exploitation of extant links 
generated by domestic multinationals or by domestic firms with significant export success; 
international scientific cooperation; upgrading of embassies in selected countries and signing of 
international cooperation treaties 
• Identifying potential partners for internationalizing companies with sustainable competitive 
advantages 
 
5. Promoting policy institutions and capabilities, including those directed to evolutionary targeting 
 
• Creating strategic STE and innovation fora for the identification of emerging strategic priorities  
• Developing policy capabilities for identifying new strategic priorities and for selecting multi-agent 
structures for targeting (sector selection) 
• Monitoring and guiding search by means of specific policy instruments. 
• Selecting or pre-selecting a subset of areas, sectors and product classes with sustainable 
competitive advantages (thus creating future options for targeting)  
• Selection of technological areas (some generic, others more specific) to underpin both 
Ph-3 targeting and the future expansion of targeted areas. 
 
6. Selected Liberalization and Institutional Reform 
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Box 5. Ph-3: Strategic Priorities and Action Areas 
 
 New sectors and sector-specific innovation systems emerge and are promoted, 
partly by means of policy targeting. These sectors feature strong partnerships and 
links with global players. Many of them gain significant inroads in global markets  
 
 Successful emergence of new, privately-owned finance and support infrastructures 
oriented to innovation by SMEs and high-tech start-ups. In some cases this will 
involve the creation of a domestic industry; in others an effective link with the 
global venture capital/private equity industry (broadly defined). In all cases a 
domestic market for the above equity-based mechanisms can be expected to emerge 
(as well as some domestic industry components and intermediaries) 
 
 Business innovation becomes increasingly knowledge-intensive and R&D based as 
well as more systematic, spread and interactive by means of innovation networks  
 
 The business sector begins to account for most national – largely privately financed 
-- R&D expenditures (associated with a sharp growth in the gross national 
expenditures on R&D/GDP ratio)  
 
 The components of the domestic knowledge subsystem operate in close 
interaction with the business innovation subsystem in generating responses to 
emerging business opportunities.  
 
 A generic capability for innovation-based structural change or “policy targeting” 
develops, including the ‘strategic level” of innovation and technology policy. Needs 
assessment and dynamic innovation policy capabilities are implemented  
 
 Active participation in international standards-setting. 
 
 The training system is attuned to the emerging needs of the business sector. 
 
 The support structure proactively searches for innovative responses to emerging 
needs in close cooperation with the private sector. 
 
 Creation of public/private mechanisms assuring the continued, endogenous 
sustaining of a virtuous STE-I co-evolutionary process. 
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Box 6-a: Truncation versus Emergence in the Aircraft industry in Argentina and Brazil 
 
 FMA (Argentina, 1927-..) 
Initial conditions: Heavy reliance on 
top-notch foreign experts working 
with a small domestic staff of skilled 
engineers and good financial backing. 
Sizable prospective domestic market. 
Motivation: national prestige. Lack of 
broad-based political coalition backing 
the initiative. 
 
Innovation system building and 
policy targeting strategy: 
discontinuous and fragmented 
acquisition S&T capability; poor 
development of managerial skills; lack 
of critical mass, insufficient nodes and 
low quality of interactions. Learning 




Incentives policy: Sporadic support 
through a narrow range of policy 
instruments and myriad political 
vicissitudes 
Business strategy: ‘privatization’ 
resulted from recognition of failure. 
Products designed by engineers for 
pilots. When the importance of the 
market was realized, it was already too 
late. 
 
Outcome: failure to capitalize on large 
investment and technical experience to 
build strategic capabilities and enter 
the jet market. Facilities basically 
reduced to maintenance and provision 
of services. 
EMBRAER (Brazil, 1969-..)∗ 
Initial conditions: Company was 
started only once critical mass of well-
trained scientific and engineering 
manpower was available to implement 
a well-conceived, long-term 
managerial and organizational 
strategy. Large prospective domestic 
market. Motivation: national self-
assertion and presence in world 
markets. Broad-based political 
coalition. 
Innovation system building strategy 
and policy targeting trategy: 
balanced, cumulative development of 
technical, scientific and managerial 
skills meeting critical mass 
requirements and integrative approach 
to node creation. Emphasis on systems 
integration, manufacturing, licensing, 
sub- contracting and co-production. 
Systematic learning in production 
often conforming to frontier 
parameters.  
Incentives policy: Broad-based and 
sustained over the decades, with 
adaptations to meet changing 
circumstances 
Business strategy: privatization 
marked definite success in 
international market. Products 
designed for success in market 
penetration. Became a market 
responsive company within a decade 
at most. Ability to correct mistakes in 
time. 
Outcome: Only emerging country 
company to succeed, against all odds, 
in entering the majors’ league. Latest 
development: entry into lower range 
large aircraft in competition with 
Boeing and Aerobus. 
Fact
ual 
                                                                  
∗ See Cassiolato, Bernardes and Lastres, op. cit., Goldstein, 2002; Embraer, 2005, Nogueira, 2002; Broad et 






Entry as key player into a complex, R&D intensive, global high-tech industry 
led by powerful incumbents (as is the case with the aerospace industry) is an 
exceptional occurrence for any country, let alone a developing one. Entry 
barriers relate not just to the mastery of a whole set of advanced scientific, 
engineering and management skills. It also is a high-risk undertaking, a 
national enterprise. It requires sizable financial resources, meeting most 
stringent market, quality and reputation thresholds, riding steep learning 
curves, operating with very extended planning horizons, developing dense 
suppliers networks and forging partnerships, or competing, with key global 
players. For all of this reasons it requires, in particular, the capacity to engage 
into dynamic policy targeting in the sense of tackling systemic (coordination, 
information) failures early enough and articulating the supply and demand of a 
wide range of sophisticated capabilities over time. It also entails frontier 
management skills and the ability to face successfully exposure to challenges in 
the context of international trade agreements. These challenges are particularly 
acute for a developing country suffering serious human capital and 
technological infrastructure deficits. 
 
Box 6-b Truncation versus Emergence in the Venture Capital Industry in Europe and 
































Israel (Avnimelech and Teubal 2006) 
 
Initial conditions: Availability of “Class A” 
venture capital organizations. Critical mass of 
high tech start-ups available prior to policy 
targeting of the venture capital industry and 
the entrepreneurial high-tech cluster. Strong 
S&T institutions and defense R&D sector. 
Favorable external and domestic environments 
(e.g Oslo peace process) 
 Innovation system building and policy 
targeting strategy” Clear strategy to develop 
strong S&T institutions. Unique design and 
appropriate timing. Focus on capabilities of 
the venture capital organization (Yozma) 
team, limited partnership form of 
organization, incentives to the upside and the 
importance of partnering with reputable 
foreign (and domestic) agents . Actual 
targeting preceded by a long ‘policy process’ 
involving changed innovation policy priorities 
(from expansion of business sector R&D to 
promoting high tech start ups) and identifying 
venture capital as the appropriate  strategy for 
advancing them . 
Incentives policy: Strong and consistent 
support of business sector R&D starting in 
1969, through an horizontal program with 
largely ‘neutral’ incentives. Incentives to high 
risk/high return financing by venture capital 
organizations targeted by Yozma 
Business strategy: Early phase 
finance/support of high tech start ups’ strategy 
adopted by the new venture capital 
organizations (which policy helped to create) 
to tap high risk/high return opportunities. 
Outcome: very successful development of a 
domestic venture capital industry/market and 
of the related entrepreneurial high-tech 
cluster. Steep ‘export’ growth of ICT-related 
goods, knowledge and company shares during 
the 1990s  
Germany, France, Italy 
 
Initial conditions: inadequate pool of start-
ups, supposed to make up the ‘demand’ for 
the services of the future venture capital 
industry/market. Weak incentives for high 
tech entrepreneurship (see below). Lack of 
financing for early phase high tech start-ups. 
Bias towards financial rather than S&T skills.  
 
Innovation system building and policy 
targeting strategy: focus on SMEs support. 
Insufficient attention to support systems for 
high tech start-ups and entrepreneurship. View 
of venture capital as a ‘pool of money’. 
Policies seeking to ‘close the early phase 
finance gap of high tech start-ups’ rather than 
to contemplate the possibility of creating a 
venture capital industry and/or market and the 
related entrepreneurial high-tech cluster. 





Incentives policy: Inappropriate bankruptcy 
laws. Lack of inducements for university 
professors to create companies (impossible in 
France till 1999).  
 
 





Outcome: relative weak development of 
venture capital financing of innovation and 
high tech start ups (particularly ‘early phase 
finance’) as a result of missing strategic 
prioritization y towards 
Factu
al 
A weaker set of pre-emergence conditions 
would have either prevented the outcomes 
attained during the 1990s or, if still feasible, 
success would have required much stronger 
policy capabilities than those actually 
available in the late 1980s, early 1990s. Thus 
if the economy and capital/exchange markets 
would not have been liberalized during the 
1980s; and if US-Israel links would not have 
evolved so favorably (e.g. if the BIRD 
program would not have existed); then the fast 
emergence process might not have occurred. 
There are also strong reasons to believe that 
if the ‘targeted’, VC directed Yozma Program 
would have been implemented either before or 
after 1993-97, its impact would have been 
substantially weaker. 
Greater attention to the creation of favorable 
pre-emergence conditions and matching 
targeting policies oriented both to a venture 
capital industry/market and to entrepreneurial 
high tech clusters. These could include 
policies enhancing technological 
entrepreneurship and policies oriented 
towards creating a critical mass of critical 
mass of start-ups, promoting experimentation 
and learning on appropriate venture capital 
organizational forms; other cultural and 
institutional changes. Also greater attention to 
the myriad institutional and capability 
dimensions of venture capital and 
entrepreneurial clusters development; and a 
dynamic view of policy and of the policy 
process leading to the attainment of such 
priorities.  
Count
er- 
Factu
al 
